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Note 
 
Sweetening the Deal: Strengthening 
Transnational Bribery Laws Through Standard 
International Corporate Auditing Guidelines 
Timothy W. Schmidt∗ 
Throughout the past several decades, the German conglo-
merate Siemens AG regularly bribed government officials in 
order to secure contracts and obtain favorable terms.1 Internal 
investigations revealed that the company made more than $1.9 
billion in bribes and other questionable payments to third par-
ties.2 After an investigation lasting more than three years, a 
German court fined the company $284 million, while fifteen 
other countries also conducted investigations into the pay-
ments.3 Siemens is one of many large corporations that bribed 
foreign government officials to gain a competitive advantage.4 
But despite recent high-profile crackdowns, some developed na-
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. and B. 
Mus. 2003, Lawrence University. The author thanks Professor Brett McDo-
nald for his original ideas and feedback on an earlier version of this piece, as 
well as Linda and Tom Vytlacil for their support. The author also thanks the 
indefatigable board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their sugges-
tions and edits, most notably Liz Borer and David Biggs. Finally, the author 
wishes to thank Guenter and Susan Schmidt for their example, encourage-
ment, and love. Copyright © 2009 by Timothy W. Schmidt. 
 1. Jack Ewing, Siemens Braces for a Slap from Uncle Sam, BUS. WK., 
Nov. 26, 2007, at 78, 78. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Peter H. Stone, White-Collar Crime—Crackdown on Foreign Bribery, 
NAT’L J., Jan. 12, 2008, at 34, 38; see Michael D. Goldhaber, How the Massive 
Siemens Bribery Scandal Made U.S.-Style Internal Investigations the New 
Model for Europe, AM. LAW., May 2008, at 92, 92 (stating that investigations 
of Siemens AG have occurred in “Austria, China, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Israel, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Norway, Rus-
sia, Switzerland, and the U.S.”). 
 4. Cf. Stone, supra note 3, at 35 (quoting a former chief of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice’s fraud section as stating that other major companies are 
being investigated for making large bribes).  
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tions are slow in pursuing the domestic corporations they sus-
pect of this behavior.5 
A bribe is the payment by a briber of something of value to 
the bribee in exchange for the bribee acting both in the briber’s 
interest and contrary to the bribee’s own duties.6 With the rise 
of government in the civilized world, the rich sought to use 
their ample resources to influence those in power.7 Such trans-
actions made sense on a basic level; on the surface, they merely 
represented the giving of something of value in exchange for a 
service rendered. But society soon began to reject bribery. An 
Egyptian pharaoh announced a penalty of death for officials 
who took bribes,8 and ancient Athens had a complex auditing 
procedure to ensure that public officials did not use their posi-
tion for personal gain.9 
When a person bribes a state official, the state suffers in a 
variety of ways. The poor of the society suffer since they cannot 
compete with the rich in the market for government services, 
be it road maintenance or criminal justice.10 The country as a 
whole breaks down when it works only for pay, not out of the 
interest of fairness.11 Government becomes inefficient and can-
not provide social services at the same levels as less-corrupt 
governments.12 Finally, bribery burdens businesses and the 
economy of a nation in general and stands as a market entry 
 
 5. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Lowell Bergman, Payload: Taking Aim at 
Corporate Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at BU1 (noting that Britain and 
Japan have declined to take part in global efforts to enforce existing antibri-
bery laws). 
 6. See Stuart P. Green, What’s Wrong with Bribery, in DEFINING CRIMES: 
ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 143, 145 (R.A. Duff & 
Stuart P. Green eds., 2005). 
 7. Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A 
MORAL IDEA 10–11, 15 (1984) (describing examples of early legislation against 
bribery in the writings of the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Israelites). 
 8. Id. at 11. 
 9. See ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION pt. 48 (P.J. Rhodes 
trans., Penguin Classics 1984). 
 10. See, e.g., Press Release, Transparency International, Poor Families 
Hit Hardest by Bribery, Even in Rich Countries, Finds New TI Poll (Dec. 6, 
2007), http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/ 
2007/2007_12_06_gcb_2007_en. 
 11. See, e.g., Sanjeev Gupta et al., Corruption and the Provision of Health 
Care and Education Services, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 
111, 132 (Arvind K. Jain ed., 2001) (“[A] high level of corruption has adverse 
consequences for a country’s child and infant mortality rates, percent of low-
birthweight babies in total births, and dropout rates in primary schools.”). 
 12. See id. 
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barrier for corporations.13 Bribery thus results in real costs to 
societies and businesses, necessitating laws to reallocate the 
cost of the bribes to the corrupt individuals who make them.14 
This Note explores a number of options to promote the pu-
nishment of corrupt businesses that bribe foreign officials, even 
when the prosecution of these businesses might not be in the 
public interest of the company’s home country. Part I examines 
several past efforts to root out transnational bribery in the 
United States and Europe, most notably the U.S. Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act. Part II critiques several new developments 
in the war against transnational bribery, including the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the ratification of an antibribery 
treaty by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Part III proposes a more robust 
treaty that not only outlaws transnational bribery, but also 
gives developed nations the tools and the motivation to detect 
it. Specifically, an international treaty against transnational 
bribery should prohibit the bribing of foreign government offi-
cials, punish companies that keep inaccurate and incomplete 
records, and provide incentives for private shareholders to sup-
port ratification and enforcement of treaty obligations. Such a 
treaty would level the playing field for businesses by cutting 
corruption and making corporations and governments more 
transparent to taxpayers and shareholders. 
 
 13. See Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Growth, and Public 
Finances, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 89, 
106 (finding a positive correlation between corruption and “the allocation of 
talent to unproductive activities” as well as a negative correlation between 
corruption and growth). But see Michael Johnston, Measuring Corruption: 
Numbers Versus Knowledge Versus Understanding, in THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 157, 157 (noting the difficulty in mea-
suring the true cost of corruption). 
 14. But see Llewellyn H. Rockwell, The Right to Bribe, FREE MARKET 
(Ludwig von Mises Inst., Auburn, Ala.) Aug. 1997, available at http:// 
mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=126 (arguing that bribes are a part 
of doing business in foreign countries and the real cost to businesses are laws 
against bribery); Pierre Lemieux, In Defense of Bribery, DAILY ARTICLE, Aug. 
8, 2005, http://www.mises.org/story/1884 (stating that some countries could 
not survive without bribes and a state which turns a blind eye to bribery is 
still better than a complete autocracy). 
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I.  PAST ATTEMPTS TO OUTLAW  
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY   
A. UNITED STATES: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
When Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) in 1977,15 it was the first attempt by a major Western 
power to crack down on its own citizens and companies for bri-
bery of foreign government officials.16 Congress passed the law 
in the wake of public revelations that several large, multina-
tional corporations were using their considerable wealth to 
bribe foreign governments.17 The Watergate scandal showed 
Congress that large American corporations used slush funds 
not only to contribute illegally to political campaigns, but also 
to bribe overseas foreign officials.18 These revelations contri-
buted to the sense among the public and some lawmakers that 
the nation needed new legislation to combat the problem of 
transnational bribery.19 
 
 15. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)), amended 
by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to  
-3, 78ff (2006), and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006).  
 16. Arvind K. Jain, Power, Politics, and Corruption, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 3, 9 (referring to the FCPA as 
“the oldest anti-bribery legislation in modern history”). But the FCPA was not 
the first U.S. legislation intended to combat corporate bribery, only the first to 
combat bribery of officials abroad. See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WIND-
SOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 12 (1982) (discussing antibribery 
provisions in several other laws, such as the Meat Inspection Act, Grain Stan-
dards Act, Internal Revue Code, Federal Trade Commission Act, and Anti-
Kickback Act). 
 17. See Wesley Cragg & William Woof, Legislating Against Corruption in 
International Markets: The Story of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 180, 181–82 (de-
scribing the public disclosure of the International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation’s request to hire the CIA to prevent Salavadore Allende’s election 
in Chile, and the revelations of kickbacks by Lockheed totaling more than 
$200,000, and bribes by Gulf Oil to Korea).  
 18. See id. at 183. 
 19. A number of other theories have been put forward to explain why the 
United States would unilaterally enact a law in which the penalties would 
hurt American citizens and companies but whose benefits would mostly be felt 
in other nations. Wesley Cragg and William Woof posit that the FCPA was a 
way for the U.S. to regain some of the moral high ground which it lost after 
Watergate and the Vietnam War. Id. at 187. John T. Noonan Jr. hypothesizes 
that the wave of anticorruption which spawned the FCPA had its roots both in 
a government trying to show that its citizens were less corrupt than the Soviet 
Union’s, and in a society substituting government and corporate purity for the 
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The FCPA consists of two parts: accounting provisions and 
antibribery provisions. The provisions go hand-in-hand to en-
sure that a company accounts for these bribes—by their nature 
secret transactions—in the company’s books. 
The antibribery provisions make it a criminal offense to 
corruptly use interstate commerce to offer or give anything of 
value to an officer or employee of a foreign government, public 
international organization, political party, or candidate for of-
fice, for the purpose of influencing any act or omission that vi-
olates a lawful duty, or securing an improper advantage, in or-
der to assist in obtaining or retaining business with, or 
directing business to, any person.20 The bribery provisions also 
prohibit giving anything of value to an agent of one of the 
above-listed people, or to any third party, with the knowledge 
that all or some of the items of value will be offered or given to 
a prohibited recipient.21 The provisions apply to any American 
citizen, national, resident, or person within the United States; 
or a business either organized in the United States or that is-
sues securities under U.S. law; or any employee, officer or any 
other agent of the above.22 It may be enforced against anyone 
inside the United States or against any U.S. person or entity 
outside the United States.23 
The accounting provisions of the FCPA require that all 
publicly traded companies keep accurate and detailed records 
while also putting into place internal controls to ensure that all 
company transactions are authorized and accounted for.24 The 
degree of detail necessary in record keeping is defined using a 
“reasonable detail” standard that would “satisfy prudent offi-
 
sexual purity lost in the 1960s and ’70s. NOONAN, supra note 7, at 598–600. 
Others point to a desire to keep companies from interfering with U.S. foreign 
interests. Mark Pieth, Introduction, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY 3, 
8 (Mark Pieth et al. eds., 2007). 
 20. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 
(2006) (applying to issuers, domestic concerns, or any person, respectively); see 
also Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 605, 612–13 (2007) (describing the elements of a violation of the 
FCPA antibribery provisions). Although not defined in the statute, legislative 
history suggests that “‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent 
to wrongfully influence the recipient.” See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 
(1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. 
 21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -3(a). 
 22. See id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(h). 
 23. See id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). 
 24. Id. §§ 78m(a), (b)(2)–(7). 
 2009] TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY LAWS 1125 
 
cials in the conduct of their own affairs.”25 The internal controls 
put in place must provide “reasonable assurances”26 that all 
transactions have been properly authorized by management;27 
all transactions have been recorded and accounted for accord-
ing to the “generally accepted accounting principles”;28 that the 
company’s assets can only be accessed with management’s ap-
proval;29 and that the company’s records are audited regularly, 
with steps taken to correct any inaccuracies found.30 
The FCPA provides for both criminal and civil penalties. 
Fines can range as high as twenty-five million dollars for com-
panies and five million dollars for individuals, while prison sen-
tences for individuals may reach twenty years.31 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) handles 
all civil investigations of publicly traded companies and may 
forward a case warranting criminal prosecution to the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ).32 The DOJ performs all criminal inves-
tigations of both public and private companies and civil investi-
gations of private companies.33 The SEC also handles civil 
injunctions against publicly traded companies and their officers 
and employees, while the DOJ files suits for monetary damag-
es.34 
B. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
Although many nations in Europe have long had robust 
domestic antibribery laws, Europe was slow to follow the U.S.’s 
lead in passing foreign antibribery laws.35 In fact, up until the 
 
 25. Id. § 78m(b)(7). 
 26. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). The FCPA later states that “reasonable assurances 
. . . mean such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent 
officials in the conduct of their own affairs.” Id. § 78m(b)(7). 
 27. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 28. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 29. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
 30. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(iv). 
 31. Id. §§ 78dd-2(d), (g), -3(d)–(e), 78ff. In reality, fines can go much high-
er since the Alternative Fine Act allows for a fine of up to twice the gain to the 
corporation or individual. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000). 
 32. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11–12 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.  
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. The United Kingdom, for example, has a history for prosecuting do-
mestic bribery since at least 1769, LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 248, LEGISLAT-
ING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION ¶ 2.2 n.4 (1997), but did not outlaw for-
eign corruption until 2001, Ingeborg Zerbes, Article 1—The Offence of Bribery 
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late 1990s, many European nations even allowed companies to 
deduct bribes to foreign officials from their taxes.36 The reasons 
for European reluctance to enact such laws are varied, but one 
thing is clear: European companies benefited competitively 
from the ability to operate in emerging markets with fewer re-
strictions than their American counterparts.37 
The end of communism and the rise in economic globaliza-
tion brought the nations of Europe together to start addressing 
transnational bribery.38 Although each European nation im-
plemented laws banning transnational bribery differently,39 
several treaties established guidelines for their signatories to 
follow. 
In December 1997, members of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) signed the Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in In-
ternational Business Transactions (the OECD Convention).40 
Thirty-seven nations ratified the OECD Convention, including 
all of Western Europe.41 The convention generally requires that 
each signatory prohibit the bribing of foreign officials, set crim-
inal and civil penalties for violations, and either extradite or 
prosecute its nationals who are accused of bribery by another 
 
of Foreign Public Officials, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra 
note 19, at 45, 87. 
 36. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Testing the Convention, OECD OB-
SERVER, March 2007, at 7, 7, available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/ 
fullstory.php/aid/2161/Testing_the_convention.html (“Not long ago, writing off 
bribes against tax was even allowed in several OECD countries; no longer.”). 
 37. See Pieth, supra note 19, at 5. 
 38. See id. at 5–6; see also Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 20, at 624; John 
T. Noonan Jr., Struggling Against Corruption, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COR-
RUPTION 227, 229–30 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2004). 
 39. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION (2007). 
 40. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 112 Stat. 3302, 37 I.L.M. 1 
(1998). 
 41. The European nations to ratify the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Pol-
and, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY 
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 
RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 12 MARCH 2008, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
59/13/40272933.pdf. Several non-European nations have ratified the agree-
ment as well, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States. Id. 
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signatory.42 It also contains provisions for continued monitoring 
of the implementation of the convention by signatories.43 The 
OECD publishes its findings on how well each signatory has 
implemented the text and spirit of the convention through leg-
islation and enforcement.44 Although the OECD convention 
largely succeeded in ensuring implementation of laws in each 
signatory nation, observers have criticized its lack of enforce-
ment mechanism and its failure to ban all aspects of bribery.45 
The Council of Europe (CoE) adopted conventions address-
ing criminal and civil penalties for corruption in January and 
November 1999, respectively.46 The CoE Criminal Law Conven-
tion on Corruption directs its signatories to adopt laws that ban 
the giving and receiving of bribes, both domestically and trans-
nationally.47 In 2003, the Council of Europe expanded the crim-
inal ban on transnational bribery to include bribes to arbitra-
tors and jurors.48 Although the CoE adopted a mechanism for 
monitoring each nation’s progress in implementation and en-
forcement, the results of the monitoring remain confidential, 
unlike the OECD Convention.49 The Convention has been 
signed by forty-four of the Council’s forty-seven member na-
tions.50  
 
 42. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, supra note 40, art. 1. 
 43. Id. art. 12. 
 44. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
Report on France, in IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, 
supra note 39, at 79. 
 45. See, e.g., Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 20, at 624 & n.127 (citing con-
cerns that the OECD enforcement varies by nation, and noting that the con-
vention does not eliminate the bribery of foreign political parties or candidates 
for office, or the tax deductibility of bribes). 
 46. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. 
No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505 [hereinafter CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corrup-
tion]; Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 174 
[hereinafter CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption]. 
 47. See CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46, ch. 
II, arts. 2–3, 17. 
 48. Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 
May 15, 2003, Europ. T.S. No. 191, available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/191.htm. 
 49. See CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46, ch. 
III, art. 24. A unit known as the Group of States Against Corruption, or GRE-
CO, is responsible for the monitoring. Id.; see also STUART H. DEMING, THE 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS, 108 
(2005) (comparing the confidential nature of GRECO’s reports with the public 
nature of the OECD’s country reports). 
 50. See Council of Europe, Chart Showing Signatures and Ratifications of 
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The companion convention the Council adopted, the CoE 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, mandates that each sig-
natory create a private right of action for recovery of damages 
due to corruption.51 The private right of action is unlike any-
thing found in either the OECD Convention or the FCPA.52 
Forty-one Council members signed, and thirty-two ratified, the 
CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption.53 
In 2003, the United Nations also adopted a convention 
against bribery.54 The U.N. Convention Against Corruption 
calls on signatories to ban, among other things, bribery, money 
laundering, trading in influence, and embezzlement.55 Like the 
CoE Civil Convention on Corruption, the U.N. Convention 
Against Corruption allows for a private right of recovery,56 
while, like the FCPA, it also includes accounting provisions.57 
The U.N. convention has been signed by 141 of the 153 U.N. 
members and ratified or accepted by 111.58 
 
Conventions and Agreements Concluded within the Council of Europe [herei-
nafter Chart Showing Signatures], http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ 
ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=1&CL=ENG. 
 51. CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46, ch. I, art. 1. 
 52. Under the FCPA, a private citizen cannot generally bring a lawsuit 
against a company that bribes foreign officials. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, 
Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027–30 (6th Cir. 1990); J.S. Serv. Ctr. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. 
Technical Servs. Co., 937 F.Supp. 216, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The 
FCPA . . . provides no explicit private right of action.”). Compare CoE Civil 
Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 46 (providing a private right of ac-
tion), with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)), amended 
by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -
3, 78ff (2006), and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006) (criminalizing bribery and provid-
ing a civil action to be brought only by the Attorney General), and Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 40, 112 Stat. at 3302–03, 37 I.L.M. at 4, (criminaliz-
ing bribery). 
 53. See Chart Showing Signatures, supra note 50. 
 54. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/58/422 (Dec. 11, 2003). 
 55. Id. arts. 15–24. 
 56. Id. art. 35. 
 57. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b) (2006); id. 
art. 12. 
 58. See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Jan. 
19, 2009). Several other international conventions also address transnational 
bribery. The European Union passed a convention in 1997 outlawing bribery 
of EU officials or members of EU governments, but it did not apply to officials 
outside of Europe. See Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving 
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the 
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C. EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 
European nations, which before their ratification of inter-
national conventions had few if any laws outlawing transna-
tional bribery, have since implemented the requirements of the 
OECD and CoE treaties in a variety of ways.59 By way of ex-
ample, this section will examine two approaches to legislating 
against transnational bribery. 
The United Kingdom, which had existing common law60 
and statutory bribery offenses,61 simply modified these existing 
 
European Union, May 26, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1 [hereinafter EU Corrup-
tion Convention]. Also in 1997, the Organization of American States ratified a 
convention that binds most nations of the Western Hemisphere to pass and 
enforce strict laws against transnational bribery. See Organization of Ameri-
can States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption arts. II–III, Mar. 
29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, 728–29 [hereinafter OAS Corruption Convention]. The 
Pacific Basin Economic Council adopted a statement the same year that “en-
courages” its twenty members to adopt laws banning transnational bribery 
and forcing businesses to abide by FCPA-like accounting standards. Pacific 
Basin Economic Council [PBEC], Statement on Standards for Transactions 
Between Business and Governments (Nov. 21, 1997), http://www.pbec.org/ 
index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=61&itemid=24.htm. 
The African Union adopted a convention in 2003 that prohibited public and 
private corruption while endorsing whistleblower provisions, but it has only 
been adopted by twenty-seven of the fifty-three nations of Africa. See African 
Union, Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, arts. 5, 12, July 
11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter AU Corruption Convention]; African Union, 
List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Conven-
tion on Preventing and Combating Corruption, http://www.africa-union.org/ 
root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African Convention on Combating Corrup-
tion.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2008). 
 59. For a complete report on the laws regarding transnational bribery in 
Europe, see THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note 19, at 289, 553–
62 (stating that enforcement of the OECD Convention is “subject to the appli-
cable rules and principles of each party,” and listing the applicable sanctions 
for each party to the Convention); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION (2004 & 2005) (providing a report for each signatory that de-
scribes the legal provisions in place to combat bribery and a review of their 
effectiveness); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation [herei-
nafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention], http://www.oecd.org/document/30/ 
0,3343,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2009) 
(listing members’ national implementing legislation by country). 
 60. See LAW COMM’N, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 2.2–.5 (1997)  
(citing a treatise and several cases, most notably R. v. Whitaker, [1914] 3 K.B. 
1283, in which a colonel accepted a bribe from a catering company in return 
for allowing the caterers to serve the colonel’s regiment). 
 61. Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64 (Eng.); Preven-
tion of Corruption Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 34 (Eng.); Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 69 (Eng.); see also LAW COMM’N, supra 
note 35, at ¶¶ 2.6–.16 (citing the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916); 
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laws by applying them to foreign agents and governments62 
while also extending U.K. jurisdiction to apply to any British 
national operating outside of the country.63 British law current-
ly provides for a criminal penalty of seven years imprisonment 
with no limit on fines for persons or corporations.64 
France complied with its convention obligations by passing 
an act that amended its Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure 
to outlaw transnational bribery,65 in addition to the existing 
provisions that prohibited domestic bribery.66 French law cur-
rently provides for a maximum incarceration penalty of ten 
years and a €150,000 fine for persons who violate the law and a 
fine of €750,000 for companies that violate the law, among oth-
er provisions.67 
II.  CRITIQUE OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO CURB 
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY   
Although the United States and most European nations 
passed strict laws to prohibit transnational bribery,68 less ac-
cord exists in the enforcement of these laws. The United States 
 
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, ORGANISATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED KINGDOM: REVIEW 
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION, 
PHASE I BIS REPORT 2–3 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
12/50/2498215.pdf (describing antibribery laws of the United Kingdom prior to 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Securities Act of 2009). 
 62. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 49 Eliz. 2, c. 24, 
§ 108(1) (Eng.). The laws were changed by simply redefining their terms to in-
clude bribery of foreign government officials within the scope of the old laws. 
See id. § 108(2)–(4). 
 63. See id. § 109. 
 64. See THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note 19, at 559. 
 65. Law No. 2000-595 of June 30, 2000, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 1, 2000, p. 9944, translated 
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report on 
France, in IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 82–85 
(2005). 
 66. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report 
on France, in IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 7 (2005) 
(referring to existing domestic bribery laws in Articles 433-1 and 432-11 of 
France’s Criminal Code that “prosecuted only active and passive bribery in-
volving French persons entrusted with public authority, charged with a public 
service mission, or holding an elected office”). 
 67. See THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note 19, at 554–55. 
 68. See generally Ingeborg Zerbes, Article 1—The Offence of Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY, supra note 
19, at 45, 84–119 (critiquing the implementation of transnational antibribery 
laws by signatories to the OECD Convention). 
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enforced its antibribery legislation with renewed vigor,69 while 
European nations have been slow to prosecute offending corpo-
rations.70 
A. THE UNITED STATES: NEW DRIVE AND NEW LAW 
1. Increasingly Vigorous Enforcement 
The United States has seen a large growth in enforcement 
under the FCPA by both the SEC and the DOJ.71 In recent 
years, the SEC hired hundreds of employees to enforce all cor-
porate compliance cases, the DOJ hired two attorneys to focus 
only on FCPA cases, and the FBI created a new four-person 
unit that handles only FCPA investigations.72 Government offi-
cials publicly announced that they will be monitoring compa-
nies for FCPA violations more carefully than they have be-
fore.73 
As a result of these changes, although only fifty persons 
and companies were named as defendants in the first twenty 
years after the FCPA was enacted, there were eighty-two de-
fendants between 1997 and July 2007.74 At the end of 2007, the 
U.S. government had open investigations into eighty-four com-
panies for FCPA violations.75 
 
 69. See, e.g., Emma Schwartz, Hiking the Cost of Bribery, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Aug. 13, 2007, at 31 (“[I]n recent years, federal prosecutors have 
begun cracking down on companies and their executives for bribing officials 
overseas. . . . Using a 1977 law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the feds 
have prosecuted four times the number of foreign bribery cases in the past 
fives years as in the preceding five.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Matthew Saltmarsh, OECD Fears Weakening of U.K. Bribery 
Stance, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Mar. 15, 2007, at 10 (“An OECD working 
group said that previous recommendations to correct shortcomings in British 
law remained unimplemented, and Britain had failed to bring a single prose-
cution in foreign bribery cases since introducing a new law in 2001.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Russell Gold & David Crawford, U.S., Other Nations Step Up 
Bribery Battle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at B1 (describing the DOJ prosecu-
tion of former Halliburton Co. executive Albert J. “Jack” Stanley and the SEC 
settlement with Baker Hughes Inc.); Schwartz, supra note 69. 
 72. Sue Reisinger, On Bended Knee: Companies Are Disclosing Overseas 
Bribes in Record Numbers. But Is Confession Always Necessary?, AM. LAW., 
July 2007, at 73, 74. 
 73. See, e.g., Eric Torbenson, Tougher Laws Have Reduced Financial 
Fraud, SEC Official Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 2007, at A5 
(quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Barry Sabin). 
 74. See William F. Pendergast & Jennifer D. Riddle, Comments Address-
ing Recent and Future FCPA Enforcement Issues, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 153, 157 (2007). 
 75. See Gold & Crawford, supra note 71 (“The U.S. federal government 
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Penalties in the United States have also been increasing. 
The SEC and the DOJ fined Baker Hughes, Inc. forty-four mil-
lion dollars for the bribery of Kazakhstani officials through 
third-party agents in Kazakhstan and Angola in order to obtain 
an oil services contract.76 Titan Corporation reached a settle-
ment with the U.S. government in which it paid more than 
twenty-eight million dollars in civil and criminal penalties for 
payments it made to the re-election campaign of the president 
of Benin in exchange for receiving higher fees for its telecom-
munications contract with the country.77 As recently as August 
2007, Textron Inc. agreed to disgorge $2.7 million in profits, 
and additionally pay nearly $2 million in fines and penalties for 
bribes, including kickbacks made to the government of Iraq re-
lating to the U.N. Oil for Food Program.78 Wary of stricter en-
forcement, companies increasingly self-report violations79 and 
enter into deferred or nonprosecution agreements with U.S. At-
torneys to avoid costly litigation and bad press.80 
 
had open investigations into 84 companies at the end of last year.”).  
 76. See Lucinda A. Low, et al., Enforcement of the FCPA in the United 
States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, in THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, supra note 72, 101, 123–24; Reisinger, supra note 
72. 
 77. See Low et al., supra note 76, at 126–27; Reisinger, supra note 72. 
 78. Litigation Release, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm’n., SEC Files Set-
tled Books and Records and Internal Controls Charges Against Textron Inc. 
for Improper Payments to Iraq Under the U.N. Oil for Food Program (Aug. 23, 
2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20251.htm. These 
amounts include disgorgement of $2,284,579 in profits, $450,461.68 in inter-
est, a civil penalty of $800,000 pursuant to the SEC prosecution, and a 
$1,150,000 fine pursuant to a DOJ nonprosecution agreement. Id. 
 79. Gold & Crawford, supra note 71 (noting that companies are increa-
singly self-reporting their FCPA violations in hopes of receiving more lenient 
penalties). 
 80. Since August 2007, the following companies have entered into de-
ferred or nonprosecution agreements with U.S. Attorney offices over allega-
tions of FCPA violations: Faro Technologies, Inc. (June 2008, $2.95 million); 
AGA Medical Corp. (June 2008, $2 million); Willbros Group, Inc. (May 2008, 
$32.3 million); AB Volvo (Mar. 2008, $19.6 million), Flowserve Corp. (Feb. 
2008, $10.5 million), Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp. (Feb. 2008, 
$677,000), Lucent Technologies (Dec. 2007, $2.5 million), Akzo Nobel N.V. 
(Dec. 2007, $3.75 million), Chevron Corp. (Nov. 2007, $27 million), Ingersoll-
Rand (Oct. 2007, $7 million); York International Corp. (Oct. 2007, $22 million), 
Paradigm B.V. (Sept. 2007, $1 million), Textron (Aug. 2007, $4.65 million) 
(agreements on file with author). 
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2. Passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Observers offer a variety of reasons for the increase in 
prosecutions, plea agreements, and voluntary disclosures,81 but 
a general consensus exists that the 2002 passage of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act82 spurred increased prosecutions due to the in-
crease of information to which the government had access.83 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 in 
response to the public unraveling of several companies due to 
fraudulent transactions and the misreporting of corporate earn-
ings.84 The law includes many provisions designed to bolster 
the public’s trust in corporate America,85 but most notably re-
 
 81. See, e.g., Low, et al., supra note 76, at 8 (citing changes to the federal 
sentencing guidelines); Schwartz, supra note 69 (citing an increase in interna-
tional cooperation and an uptick in the amount of corporate mergers and ac-
quisitions); Claudius O. Sokenu, Record-Setting Penalties Show New Push 
Under FCPA, N.Y. L. J., Aug. 6, 2007, (citing cooperation between the SEC 
and the DOJ as a reason for an increase in prosecution); cf. David Hess, A 
Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2007) (noting that the Fed-
eral Guidelines were amended in 2004 due to a requirement in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act that they be reviewed). 
 82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.); see also Press Release, White 
House, President Bush Signs Corporate Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html. 
 83. See Low, et al., supra note 76 (describing how the enactment of Sar-
banes-Oxley has intensified ethics and compliance programs of U.S. listed 
companies); Reisinger, supra note 72 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 man-
dated extra record keeping duties, compliance programs, and ‘whistle blower’ 
hotlines that have turned up numerous bribe allegations.”); Schwartz, supra 
note 69 (describing how Sarbanes-Oxley has “increased reporting require-
ments for public companies” leading “many firms to beef up internal investiga-
tion units” and provided incentives to disclose wrongdoing). 
 84. See Suzanne Malreaux, Bush Signs Bill to Stop ‘Book Cooking,’ CNN, 
July 31, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/30/bush 
.corporate.reform/index.html; cf. Hess, supra note 81, at 1782 (describing the 
persistent corruption concerns and the role of SOX in “restoring public trust in 
the marketplace”). 
 85. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. E1451 (daily ed. July 22, 2002) (statement of 
Rep. Sununu) (“[Sarbanes-Oxley will include] a requirement for real-time cor-
porate disclosure, [in order to] better protect investors. . . . [It will] streng-
then[ ] the penalties for corporate fraud, [which] will act as a better deterrent 
to those seeking to stretch or, [sic] test the boundaries of the law. . . . [And it 
will include an] investor restitution provision [which] will enable investors 
who lose money in the markets as a result of corporate malfeasance to reclaim 
the gains of corporate criminals.”). Sarbanes-Oxley also includes a prohibition 
on nonaudit work by auditing firms, Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 201–209, a re-
quirement that companies establish independent audit committees, § 301, the 
creation of an oversight board, §§ 101–109, and a prohibition on loans to cor-
porate executives, § 402. 
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quires certification of company financial statements by top ex-
ecutives,86 protects whistleblowers who report suspected corpo-
rate fraud from retaliation,87 and holds corporate management 
and auditors responsible for maintaining and assessing an in-
ternal corporate system for financial reporting to the SEC.88 
The Act caused a good deal of consternation among corpora-
tions, which balked at the estimated cost of the new require-
ments.89 
Additional certification and reporting requirements of Sar-
banes-Oxley bolstered the existing accounting provisions of the 
FCPA and gave the SEC new information about the goings-on 
inside America’s publicly traded companies.90 It also upped the 
ante for companies, exposing corporate directors to increased 
liability if they chose not to comply with the law.91 Under the 
pressure, many corporations chose to report dubious transac-
tions that may or may not have constituted FCPA violations ra-
ther than take the risk that the SEC would find out on its own 
later.92 
B. EUROPE: MIXED SIGNALS ON BRIBERY 
Though the U.S. government turned up the heat on trans-
national bribery violations, enforcement in Europe was more 
lukewarm. The United Kingdom especially has been called to 
task for failing to enforce its laws against transnational bri-
bery.93 In early 2007, the U.K. halted an investigation into 
weapons manufacturer BAE Systems, with Prime Minister To-
ny Blair intimating that the prospect of losing “thousands of 
British jobs and billions worth of pounds for British industry” 
 
 86. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1350(a). 
 87. Id. § 1514A(a). 
 88. Id. §§ 7241(a), 7262. 
 89. See, e.g., Auditing Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, ECONO-
MIST, May 21, 2005, at 71 (“America’s businessmen are deeply unhappy, and 
with reason: the initial costs of the [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] have been bigger 
than expected.”). A study by Ivy Xiying Zhang of the William E. Simon Gradu-
ate School of Business Administration at the University of Rochester predicts 
that the law will cost businesses $1.4 trillion. Id. 
 90. See Schwartz, supra note 69. 
 91. Id. (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . increased reporting require-
ments for public companies and put the liability for their veracity directly on 
top executives.”). 
 92. See Reisinger, supra note 72 (stating that, according to a case digest 
published by Shearman & Sterling LLP, from 2005 to 2007, twenty-one of the 
twenty-five new FCPA cases were self-reported).  
 93. Saltmarsh, supra note 70.  
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was not worth pursuing prosecution.94 In addition, the U.K. 
government failed to prosecute any transnational bribery cases 
as of early 2007, despite numerous investigations.95 A report by 
Transparency International in September 2008 suggests that 
little progress has been made since then.96 An organization offi-
cial lamented: “The Government has known for a decade that it 
had to act; but it has dithered indecisively while the country’s 
reputation has been ruined.”97 
France, Italy, and the Netherlands have increased the 
amount of transnational bribery cases prosecuted.98 But anec-
dotal evidence seems to indicate that these nations are not ag-
gressive enough.99 In one case, for example, Costa Rica brought 
charges against the French telecommunications company Alca-
tel in 2004, though prosecution by France itself was not forth-
coming.100 
Germany is an exception in Europe, with investigations of 
Bristol-Myers, GlaxoSmithKline, DaimlerChrysler, Philips, and 
Siemens AG currently underway.101 As of October 2007, 
charges have been filed against Siemens executives involving 
the bribery of Italian officials.102 
The wide discrepancy in prosecution of laws against trans-
national bribery requires a reevaluation of how regulators 
around the world pursue and put an end to this widespread in-
ternational corruption. 
 
 94. Christopher Adams et al., Blair Defends Move to Halt BAE Inquiry, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 15, 2006. 
 95. See Saltmarsh, supra note 70. 
 96. Cash for Honours Blackens UK’s Reputation, BIRMINGHAM POST, Sept. 
24, 2008, at 9. 
 97. Id. (quoting Chandrashekhar Krishnan, executive director of Transpa-
rency International UK). 
 98. Doreen Carvajal, A Global Effort to Root Out Corporate Bribery is 
Flagging, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), July 18, 2007, at 9. 
 99. For example, these nations often will not prosecute instances of bri-
bery of foreign officials by their domestic corporations, even when other na-
tions found sufficient evidence to bring charges. 
 100. Carol Matlack et al., Cracking Down on Corporate Bribery, BUS. WK., 
Dec. 6, 2004, at 30. 
 101. Margaret Ayres et al., Developments in U.S. and International Efforts 
to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT’L LAW. 597, 606 (2007). 
 102. Saltmarsh, supra note 70. 
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III.  RETHINKING THE UNILATERAL APPROACH TO 
CORPORATE AUDITING REQUIREMENTS   
In order to get a tighter grip on foreign bribery, member 
states of the OECD should pass a new convention, called the 
Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention, which would 
require management of all companies publicly traded on stock 
exchanges within member states to certify that company books 
are accurate, certify that management has control over corpo-
rate assets, and have an independent auditor certify that such 
control existed. In addition, the OECD convention would 
mandate that national auditor boards would confer on a regu-
lar basis to ensure that auditing standards would be similar 
from nation to nation. The benefits that ratification would 
bring to shareholders in companies traded in signatory nations 
would make it more feasible to garner enough support to ratify 
the convention. 
A. A NEW OECD CONVENTION ON CORPORATE AUDITING AND 
CERTIFICATION 
First, member states would need to pass laws requiring 
corporate executives of publicly traded companies to certify 
that their companies’ financial statements are accurate103 and 
provide criminal sanctions for knowingly filing an incorrect fi-
nancial statement.104 These provisions would create greater ac-
countability with corporate management for financial irregular-
ities and prevent companies from claiming that they did not 
realize that employees created slush funds or bribed foreign of-
ficials. 
Second, member states would need to pass laws requiring 
corporate executives of publicly traded companies to certify 
that management had control over all of the company’s assets 
and have an external auditor attest to that fact.105 This provi-
sion would enact the recommendations that the Council of the 
OECD made in May 1997 but that were not incorporated into 
 
 103. Cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 302(a)(1)–(3), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7241(a)(1)–(3) (2006) (requiring a signing officer to attest that the financial 
report fairly presents the financial condition of the corporation). 
 104. Cf. id. § 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a) (2006) (requiring each periodic fi-
nancial report to contain a written statement of the CEO and CFO (or equiva-
lent thereof ) that the report fairly represents the financial condition of the 
corporation). 
 105. Cf. id. § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006) (requiring management to estab-
lish adequate internal control structures for financial reporting). 
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the Convention on Bribery.106 In addition, this provision would 
secure the obligation for internal controls with the requirement 
that both corporate management and external auditors affirm 
that adequate internal controls existed. 
Finally, member states would agree to create national ac-
counting boards that would confer on a regular basis to create 
substantially similar auditing guidelines for all OECD member 
nations.107 These accounting boards would create the specific 
guidelines that corporate auditors would have to abide by when 
auditing the internal controls of publicly traded companies. 
B. NECESSARY STEPS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION 
The Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention, 
much like the OECD Convention on Bribery, would be drafted 
by the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and come into force only after a majority of 
the largest exporting nations had signed the document.108 By 
way of example, a few nations will be considered to demon-
strate the necessary changes that they would need to enact 
when becoming a part of the new convention. 
After the United States becomes a signatory to the Corpo-
rate Auditing and Certification Convention, Congress would 
not need to make many changes to existing United States law. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act already requires corporate manage-
ment to certify the accuracy of books and adequacy of control 
over assets, as well as to have auditor certification.109 Regula-
tions concerning the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, also created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, could be mod-
 
 106. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
REVISED RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (1997), available at http://www.oecd 
.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2048160_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
 107. Cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101, 103, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211, 7213 
(2006) (establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to over-
see and audit public companies). 
 108. Cf. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, supra note 40. 
 109. Section 302 of the Act requires that management of public companies 
certify that their financial statements are accurate “in all material respects.” 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3). Section 906 
contains provisions for criminal sanctions against CEOs and CFOs who will-
fully and knowingly make material misstatements in financial reports. Id. 
§ 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a). Section 404 contains provisions for management 
certification that the internal controls of the company are adequate, backed up 
by an external auditor. Id. § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262. 
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ified to allow for its consultation with other national accounting 
boards set up pursuant to the new convention.110  
Similarly, Japan has already enacted a law that mirrors 
Sarbanes-Oxley in the United States in several regards.111 Mi-
nor adjustments to this legislation could bring that nation into 
compliance with the new convention. 
European nations would have to pass new laws to imple-
ment the convention, although some European states have be-
gun implementing rules requiring certification of internal con-
trols.112 France, for instance, has rules requiring management 
to assess its internal controls,113 and the European Union re-
quires that publicly traded companies have an audit commit-
tee.114 
Though European Union member nations would sign the 
convention individually,115 existing European Union law re-
quires that any changes member nations make to their laws 
concerning regulation of companies and securities be in harmo-
ny.116 
 
 110. Id. §§ 101–109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7219. 
 111. See Kinyū Shōhin Torihiki Hou [Financial Instruments and Exchange 
Law (FIEL)], Law No. 65 of 2006; see also FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, JA-
PAN, NEW LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION: “THE FINAN-
CIAL INSTRUMENTS AND EXCHANGE LAW” (2006), available at http://www 
.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/20061010.pdf. Similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, Japan’s law 
requires that companies demonstrate internal control over their finances. Je-
remy Grant, Sarbox Changes Welcomed but Imitators Still Abound, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Mar. 22, 2007, at 23. 
 112. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack 
Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 
1903 n.329 (listing several European nations with laws or proposed laws re-
garding assessment of internal controls). 
 113. Grant, supra note 111. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Although the European Union could itself be a signatory to the new 
convention, it still cannot bind its member states to treaties that it signs un-
less its member states have given it permission to do so, even after the new 
Reform Treaty was signed in Portugal in December 2007. Stephen Mulvey, A 
Close Look at the Reform Treaty, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co 
.uk/2/hi/europe/6928737.stm (last visited Jan. 19, 2009). 
 116. See NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 843–47 (2002), for 
a discussion of securities-regulating institutions in the European Union. 
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C. THE BENEFITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON 
CORPORATE AUDITING AND CERTIFICATION 
1. Decrease in the Bribery of Foreign Government Officials 
Passage of a new OECD convention with powerful account-
ing provisions would better ensure that foreign bribery could 
not continue unnoticed. Slush funds and under-the-table trans-
actions would be harder to hide with independent auditors 
combing over corporate files and corporate management run-
ning the risk of personal liability if their company’s filings were 
incorrect.117 Even if some governments failed to prosecute un-
der their own accounting or bribery laws, the increased public 
information generated by the accounting requirements would 
make it easier for other nations to prosecute or for shareholders 
to sue for recovery. 
2. Additional Benefits to Europe 
Even if the proposed Corporate Auditing and Certification 
Convention results in a decrease in the bribery of foreign offi-
cials, European governments would still require a reason to 
motivate them into signing it.118 The added costs to European 
companies of complying with certification and auditing re-
quirements would prevent some nations from signing on, in the 
absence of any other compelling reason to agree to such an ar-
rangement. 
First, many European companies are already subject to 
these sorts of requirements, due to their listing on stock ex-
changes in the United States.119 For example, companies such 
as Toyota Motor, Sony, HBSC, and BP are based in foreign 
countries, yet still need to abide by Sarbanes-Oxley since they 
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.120 These large 
 
 117. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed, a similar effect took place in the 
United States. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 69 (quoting Matt Morley, a 
Washington, D.C. lawyer who defends companies in bribery cases, stating that 
“[c]ompanies are less willing to take the risk that a violation they learned of 
won’t be discovered”). 
 118. The sweeping changes to United States law was due to the Enron cri-
sis. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, 
Repenting in Leisure 2 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 06-14, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899593. 
 119. Hannah Clark, Sarbanes-Oxley Goes Global, FORBES, July 13, 2006, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/07/13/leadership-sarbox-governance-
cx_hc_0713sarboxgoesglobal_print.html. 
 120. Id. 
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multinational corporations faced the decision of whether to del-
ist in the United States and instead go to a competing exchange 
where Sarbanes-Oxley would not be enforced, or stay in the 
U.S. and invest in the necessary changes to corporate auditing 
practices that the law required. After investing so much money 
into making their own corporate practices more transparent, 
the companies have an incentive to force their counterparts 
listed on the London or Paris stock exchanges to abide by simi-
lar guidelines rather than get away with less rigorous auditing 
standards. 
Second, European shareholders would benefit from the ad-
ditional details about companies that they would gain from the 
requirement of certification and auditing.121 Although Euro-
pean nations already have reporting requirements, they are not 
as stringent as requirements in the United States and Ja-
pan.122 This lack of adequate information makes it more diffi-
cult for investors to fully understand the relative risk and value 
of owning a particular security. In addition, some studies show 
that companies with greater internal controls also perform bet-
ter.123 
A major hurdle to any convention would be the perception 
that America was attempting to force its laws upon other na-
tions. Even some American commentators suggest that Euro-
pean nations should stand up to American attempts to outlaw 
international bribery.124 But many Western nations already 
took steps against international bribery of their own accord. 
Adoption of a Corporate Auditing and Certification Convention 
would add a uniformity to laws and transparency to enforce-
ment that currently does not exist. 
So long as the perceived benefits to the shareholders are 
greater than the decrease in share value due to the increased 
 
 121. Prentice & Spence, supra note 112, at 1906 (“[C]ertification of finan-
cial statements and internal financial controls . . . provide useful information 
to the capital markets that will allow them to allocate capital more efficient-
ly.”). 
 122. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 59.  
 123. Prentice & Spence, supra note 112, at 1905 (citing a study which 
found that surveyed companies with effective internal controls had an average 
share price increase of over twenty-five percent, while those that had ineffec-
tive internal controls decreased more than five percent). 
 124. See Rockwell, supra note 14 (“[C]ountries should stand up to the U.S. 
government by taking the only correct free-market position: there should be no 
laws against bribing foreign officials. In many countries, bribes are the only 
means for outwitting leviathan, and thus serve as an institutional bulwark of 
prosperity.”). 
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cost of regulation, European shareholders will also favor laws 
forcing companies to certify and audit their books, making im-
plementation of the convention more feasible. 
3. Additional Benefits to the United States 
A corporate auditing and certification convention that in-
corporates many of the existing requirements of the accounting 
provisions of the FCPA and the certification and auditing re-
quirements of Sarbanes-Oxley would benefit the United States 
in several ways. 
First, such a treaty would level the playing field for United 
States companies.125 As was the case after the passage of the 
FCPA in the 1970s,126 American companies acted as guinea 
pigs for a new corporate governance law.127 Enactment of an 
OECD convention would decrease the incentive for companies 
to delist or list on foreign stock exchanges to save them from 
the extra burden of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley.128 
Second, such an OECD convention would increase the like-
lihood that United States regulators could bring non-U.S.-
based companies to justice when they commit acts of foreign 
bribery. The increased information which audited and certified 
company records create would give prosecutors more informa-
tion to work from when pursuing charges against American 
employees or subsidiaries of foreign companies.129 
Third, just as a Corporate Auditing and Certification Con-
vention would benefit American companies by leveling the 
playing field for companies, such a convention would benefit 
 
 125. See, e.g., MOLONEY, supra note 116, at 7 (noting, in the context of Eu-
ropean securities regulation, that “[r]egulatory divergences and the duplica-
tion of rules can amount to non-tariff barriers . . . and prevent the develop-
ment of the level playing-field . . . .”). 
 126. See Jain, supra note 16, at 9. 
 127. While SOX affects every company listed on the U.S. stock exchange, 
American companies make up the vast majority of the companies traded on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ (86.1% on the NYSE, and 90% on the NASDAQ in 
June 2006 as reported in http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp 
?menu=395). 
 128. See Clark, supra note 119 (stating that seventeen percent of European 
firms would consider delisting from United States stock exchanges to keep 
from having to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 129. See Joseph P. Covington et al., FCPA Enforcement in a Sarbanes-
Oxley World, LAW J. NEWSLS.: CORP. COUN., Aug. 2005, http://www.jenner 
.com/news/pubs_item.asp?id=000013116724 (noting that increased self-
disclosure of violations due to Sarbanes-Oxley has led to more prosecutions for 
FCPA violations). 
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potential American shareholders of European securities. Certi-
fication would increase the information available to potential 
shareholders of European securities, leading to more efficient 
distribution of capital.130 Informed shareholders can make more 
informed decisions about whether a company is healthy or 
weak, increasing certainty and decreasing perceived risk. 
Sarbanes-Oxley undoubtedly added cost to businesses. But 
despite widespread corporate opposition, the Act is likely here 
to stay as U.S. court challenges continue to founder. The D.C. 
Circuit in August 2008 ruled that Sarbanes-Oxley did not vi-
olate either the Appointments Clause or the principle of sepa-
ration of powers.131 While the losing plaintiffs in the D.C. Cir-
cuit looked to Congress and the SEC for relief,132 action by 
either of those bodies looks increasingly unlikely as the housing 
crisis has turned the public against corporations133 and has led 
to calls for increased corporate regulation by both the SEC134 
and the White House.135 
With Sarbanes-Oxley as a reality for corporations in the 
United States, American corporations’ best hope of competi-
tiveness is for the costs to be shared by businesses in other na-
tions. For American corporations, compliance should cost less 
with uniform laws on corporate auditing and certification than 
with a variety of standards.136 
 
 130. Prentice & Spence, supra note 112, at 1906 (“[C]ertification of finan-
cial statements and internal financial controls . . . provide useful information 
to the capital markets that will allow them to allocate capital more efficient-
ly.”). 
 131. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 
667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008). It is unclear whether the plaintiffs will file a petition 
for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See Statement of Brad Beckstead, Manag-
ing Partner, Beckstead and Watts, LLP (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www 
.becksteadwatts.com/index.html (“I am currently discussing all legal options 
with our firm’s attorneys.”). 
 132. See Statement of Brad Beckstead, supra note 131 (“I encourage Con-
gress and the SEC to take action now to remove the “barriers to entry” to US 
capital markets for small and developing companies by exempting micro- and 
small-cap public companies and smaller audit firms from the regulatory over-
sight of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”). 
 133. See Kara Scannell et al., Bailout Stirs Calls for Deeper Regulation, 
WALL ST. J. Sept. 24, 2008, at A1.  
 134. Id. (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox as stating the crisis hig-
hlighted a “regulatory hole that must be immediately addressed”). 
 135. Id. (noting Treasury Secretary Henry Paulsen’s advocacy for an in-
creased government role in financial markets). 
 136. Cf. Mark B. Baker, Promises and Platitudes: Toward a New 21st Cen-
tury Paradigm for Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 123, 161 
(2007) (stating that, in the context of state law, uniform laws on corporate 
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4. Additional Benefits to All Developed Nations 
Though an OECD Corporate Certification and Auditing 
Convention would have unique benefits for the United States 
and Europe, it would also have positive effects on humanitarian 
efforts, diplomacy, and economies to all signatories. 
First, such a convention would help ensure that foreign aid 
is better spent in developing economies. Currently, much for-
eign aid ends up lining the pockets of corrupt foreign officials 
rather than helping its intended recipients.137 A corrupt atmos-
phere will drive away foreign investment, along with a commu-
nity’s chance to prosper from it.138 Developing economies often 
lack the resources that developed nations possess when it 
comes to combating such abuses.139 An international conven-
tion requiring certification of financial reports and auditing of 
internal controls would make foreign aid more effective. 
A convention that banded nations together towards forcing 
multinational conglomerates to better report and authenticate 
their books and records would also improve the national securi-
ty of member nations. One of the original reasons behind the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was to ensure that corporations 
did not stray far into the area of international foreign policy 
through bribery,140 and the same rationale holds true today.141 
Several powerful governments policing companies, all armed 
with common information about discrepancies in the company’s 
financial records, would decrease the likelihood that one com-
pany will remain above the law. 
 
compliance would “remove redundancies and economic inefficiency”). 
 137. For example, the SEC alleges that Textron, an industrial equipment 
company, paid $650,539 in “kickback payments” as part of its sale of humani-
tarian supplies in the Iraq Oil for Food Program. U.S. Sec. and Exchange 
Comm’n, supra note 78. 
 138. See Allan Gerson et al., Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role, 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 118 (2001) (stating that while a corrupt marketplace may 
benefit individual companies, a culture of corruption will drive off foreign in-
vestment). 
 139. See David Pilling, Zoellick Charts Bank’s New Direction, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Aug. 10, 2007, at 2 (citing Cambodia’s loss of its intellectuals to ge-
nocide as an example of how some countries lack the basic human capital to 
fight corruption). 
 140. Pieth, supra note 19, at 8 (citing fears that defense industries could 
open up illicit markets in the Middle East through bribery). 
 141. See, e.g., Saltmarsh, supra note 70 (citing a statement by Prime Mi-
nister Tony Blair that a bribery investigation would damage diplomatic rela-
tions); Andrew Hill, BAE Proves Its Readiness for Just This Sort of War, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 9, 2007 (detailing the U.K.’s fear that investigating a 
defense corporation for its bribery would hurt foreign relations). 
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Although some of these benefits may accrue whether or not 
nations put forth a united effort towards mandating corporate 
certification of records and auditing of controls, a scheme with 
a common standard would go a long way in ensuring com-
pliance and lowering costs for businesses.142 The international 
financial community has already stepped towards other inter-
national corporate standards, most notably with the coalescing 
of national accounting practices around the International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards (IFRS).143 In August 2008, the 
SEC voted to begin the process of switching to IFRS in place of 
the current GAAP standards used in the United States by 
2014.144 Canada and Japan plan to switch to the standard by 
2011.145 The adoption of uniform accounting standards by coun-
tries around the world demonstrates an existing commitment 
to transparency in corporate books and records, and bodes well 
for similar advances in auditing and certification standards. 
  CONCLUSION   
Bribery of foreign government officials harms both the de-
veloping and developed world. Current government regulations, 
while an improvement over past systems, still fail to provide 
adequate enforcement of existing laws against bribery. In addi-
tion, the United States has taken a lead role in the prosecution 
of corporate bribers, thanks in part to its more robust require-
ments for the certification and auditing of financial reports of 
companies which are publicly traded there. By creating uniform 
standards through an international convention requiring man-
 
 142. See, e.g., MOLONEY, supra note 116, at 7 (noting, in the context of Eu-
ropean securities regulation, that “[r]egulatory divergences and the duplica-
tion of rules can amount to non-tariff barriers . . . and prevent the develop-
ment of the level playing-field . . . .”). 
 143. The International Accounting Standards Board publishes the Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which are permitted or required 
for use on financial reports in 113 nations. IASPlus.com, IAS Plus—Use of 
IFRSs by Jurisdiction, http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2009). 
 144. Kara Scannell & Joanna Slater, SEC Moves to Pull Plug on U.S. Ac-
counting Standards, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at A1; News Release, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Ac-
counting Standards to Help Investors Compare Financial Information More 
Easily (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
184.htm. 
 145. AICPA Announces Web Site on International Financial Reporting 
Standards, CPA LETTER (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, New York, 
N.Y.), June 2008, at 1, available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/cpaltr/ 
2008_06/jun08.pdf. 
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agement certification of financial reports and external auditing 
of internal controls, corporate activities will become more 
transparent world wide. While shareholders appreciate such 
transparency so they can better appreciate a corporation’s 
worth and risk, governments can use this information to prose-
cute companies that try to obtain an unfair advantage through 
bribery of foreign government officials. 
